I was interviewed by Focus Malaysia on the rights of minority shareholders in a public listed company context. My view was that there were limited options for the minority to express their displeasure at the directors or management of the company.
The interview was partly through email answers and also through a phone call. I set out below my emailed answers setting out my views.
Focus Malaysia 16 July 2016 issue
The High Court has recently upheld the existence of the multiple derivative action in Malaysia. This is seen in the decision of Ranjeet Singh Sidhu & Anor v Zavarco plc & Ors [2016] 2 CLJ 975 (and with the original Grounds of Judgment here).
A multiple derivative action is where a shareholder of a holding company files an action on behalf of the subsidiary of that holding company. This common law action would allow shareholders to seek relief against wrongdoings where there are wrongs carried out against subsidiaries further down the corporate structure.
In the face of wrongdoings carried out against a company or its subsidiary, the law would clothe a suitably interested representative with the necessary standing to bring an action on behalf of the wronged company and to be the company’s champion.
[my article originally published on The Malaysian Lawyer]
The Dewan Rakyat, the lower house of Parliament, passed the Companies Bill 2015 on 4 April 2016. It was first tabled for Second Reading on Thursday 31 March 2016 and Parliament continued and concluded its debate on 4 April 2016.
Upcoming Changes
I had previously written on some of the upcoming changes, especially on the challenges that directors may face and I was also featured on The Edge TV.
The new Companies Act will undoubtedly transform Malaysia’s corporate landscape. Underpinning the changes are the aims of spurring entrepreneurship, making the corporate vehicle more attractive for businesses, deregulating certain aspects of the corporate process, and to introduce the concept of corporate rescue for ailing companies.
It is anticipated that the new Companies Act itself will not be brought into force until a year’s time or so. This is because the new regulations, rules and guidelines will still need to be drawn up.
I set out below 7 of the more significant areas we will see in the new Companies Act.
In an earlier article on ‘Getting Away with Fraud: Defraud the Subsidiary?‘, I had written about the development of the multiple derivative action in other jurisdictions. This is where a shareholder of a holding company brings an action on behalf of a subsidiary of that holding company. In a way, it allows you to skip past one or more levels of the corporate structure in order to bring an action for a wrong done to that subsidiary.
In the recent unreported Grounds of Judgment dated 16 November in the Zavarco case, the High Court upheld the existence of a multiple derivative action in Malaysia. It is therefore possible for a shareholder to bring such an action.
An article analysing the multiple derivative action where a shareholder of a holding company can possibly file an action on behalf of a subsidiary of that holding company.
Where a wrong has been carried out against a company, the rule in Foss v Harbottle provides that the company itself must bring an action and not the shareholder of the company. An aggrieved shareholder may be left powerless in the face of wrongdoing by the majority.
The common law then carved out an exception for a shareholder to bring an action on behalf of the company where the company itself is unable to do so. This is allowed where a wrong is committed against the company and at the same time, the wrongdoers are in control of the company. This is known as a ‘fraud on the minority’ as the wrongdoers are able to prevent the company from taking action against them. In these circumstances, a derivative action by the shareholder on behalf of the company is allowed.
Certain jurisdictions have also extended the derivative action to allow a shareholder of a parent company to bring an action on behalf of a subsidiary of that parent company. Such an action has been termed as a multiple derivative action.
The ability to bring a multiple derivative action is extremely pertinent in today’s world, where businesses can be and are often structured into a multi-tiered group of companies and subsidiaries. Shareholders may invest in the investment holding company, with the actual businesses being run and assets held by the first-tier or second-tier subsidiaries further down the corporate structure.
Lord Millet, writing extra-judicially in Multiple Derivative Actions, Gore-Browne bulletin July 2010, succinctly describes the consequences if the situation were otherwise:
“The moral for would be fraudsters is simple; choose [a] company, and be careful to defraud its subsidiary and not the company itself.”
We will discuss the availability of the multiple derivative action in various jurisdictions and the application of these cases in Malaysia. Continue reading
For those interested, the Companies Bill 2015 has finally been released. It clocks in at 628 pages (solely for the English version), 610 clauses, and 13 Schedules.
Do note that the English version will be authoritative text of the Bill (see P.U.(B) 403/2015 under the National Language Acts 1963/67).
From my quick reading, the Companies Bill 2015 does differ from the 2013 consultation copy issued by the Companies Commission. There have been improvements and tweaks made to several of the sections, while possibly leaving some lacunas.
Will cover more of the areas in future posts. I have to soon say goodbye to oft-used sections like sections 176, 181, 181A, and 218 under the Companies Act 1965 and then memorise new sections.
I was interviewed by The Edge Financial Daily and I shared my views on some of the challenges that directors will face under the upcoming Companies Bill.
“It’s not an easy balancing act to be done. But if you are speaking from the perspective of minority shareholders or even shareholders, I would say they will be welcoming these changes because there is more information, and the directors have to allow a platform for the shareholders to discuss, query, ask questions, even if it’s not contained specifically in any audited accounts.
“Free flow of information is quite welcomed,” Lee told The Edge Financial Daily after presenting his paper “New Companies Bill: Upcoming Changes and Impact on Directors and Shareholders” at the Malaysia Legal and Corporate Conference on Oct 7.
Although Lee welcomed the greater flow of information and interaction between the board and the shareholders, he warned of the possibility of shareholders abusing the new privileges to the detriment of the company and its operations.”
My views in The Edge were also briefly discussed on the BFM Morning Run.
It appears from the Parliament website that the Companies Bill 2015 was tabled for its First Reading on 19 October 2015 and its Second Reading on 20 October 2015. We are now close to ushering in the new laws.
I was a speaker at the Malaysian Legal and Corporate Conference 2015 today. I then gave a short interview to The Edge to explain a bit more on the expected changes in the upcoming Companies Bill.
In winding up proceedings, the Companies (Winding-up) Rules 1972 provide for strict timelines for the filing of the affidavits. Rule 30 provides that the affidavit in opposition to the Petition shall be filed and served at least 7 days before the hearing of the Petition. In turn, the Petitioner’s affidavit in reply to the affidavit in opposition shall be filed and served within 3 days of the date of service of the affidavit in opposition. This makes the timeline very tight, especially for the Petitioner’s affidavit in reply.
Since the Court of Appeal decision in Crocuses & Daffodils (M) Sdn Bhd v Development & Commercial Bank Bhd [1997] 2 MLJ 756, there has been a line of authorities which has applied these timelines strictly. This is due to the use of the word “shall” in the Rule 30.
Court of Appeal decision in Kilo Asset
In the recent unreported grounds of judgment in Hiew Tai Hong v Kilo Asset Sdn Bhd, the Court of Appeal had to consider the issue as to whether there could be an extension of time to allow for the late filing of the various affidavits in a winding up Petition. In this case, the winding up petition involved a shareholder dispute where the petition relied largely on the just and equitable grounds. Extensive facts and the history between the shareholders were set out in the petition. This was not a case where the petition was based on an inability to pay debt and where a creditor was petitioning for winding up.
While the affidavits in opposition by the respondent were filed in time, the Petitioner filed his three affidavits in reply well past the 3-day timeline as set out in Rule 30. The Respondent then filed further affidavits in opposition. Presumably because of an objection raised on the late filing of the affidavits in reply, the Petitioner filed an application for an extension of time. This application was based on Rule 193 which allows for enlargement or abridgment of time and Rule 194 which provides that no proceedings shall be invalidated by any formal defect or any irregularity unless the Court views that substantial injustice has been caused.
The High Court Judge dismissed the Petitioner’s extension of time application and therefore disregarded the Petitioner’s affidavits in reply. As the High Court Judge viewed that the Respondent’s affidavits in opposition was therefore left unanswered, the Petition was dismissed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the extension of time and ordered that the Petition be remitted back to the High Court for a full hearing. Firstly, the Court of Appeal was guided by the wordings of Rules 193 and 194 which would allow for an extension of time. These Rules were not referred to in the judgment of Crocuses & Daffodils. This is consistent with the current approach of the Courts to have regard to the justice of the case and not only to the technical non-compliance.
Secondly, the Court of Appeal also made a distinction between the present just and equitable winding up Petition and a Petition based on an inability to pay a debt (the latter being the Petition in Crocuses & Daffodils). In a just and equitable winding up Petition, involving a dispute among the shareholders and allegations against the directors, it is common for the facts to be hotly disputed and where there is the possibility of cross-examination of deponents as well. Therefore, it would not be possible for the Court to adopt such a rigid approach to non-compliance.
Commentary
This decision is welcomed in taking a step away from a mechanical rigid approach for such affidavit timelines. Instead, the Court weighs up the justice of the case in deciding whether to allow for an extension of time or not. This is even more important in such a just and equitable winding up scenario where the facts are commonly disputed and where it is very common to have an extensive exchange of affidavits.
In practice, for a just and equitable winding up petition, the solicitors commonly agree among themselves for an extension of time for the filing and exchange of affidavits. It can be very difficult for the Petitioner to comply with the 3-day rule to file in the affidavit in reply. Rule 30 is also silent in allowing for the further filing of affidavits since no timeline is provided. This decision however appears to only apply in the context of such a Petition based on the just and equitable ground. A party seeking such an extension of time must still file in an application under Rules 193 and 194.
However, this decision does not go so far as to outright overrule the Crocuse & Daffodils approach in maintaining strict timelines for the inability to pay debt scenario. It can also be quite common to have a lengthy exchange of affidavits if the debt is heavily in dispute. Nonetheless, to prevent the risk of such a technical objection, all parties had best still comply strictly with the timelines set out in Rule 30.
The Singapore High Court in the Silica Investors case (Silica Investors Ltd v Tomolugen Holdings Limited and others [2014] SGHC 101) refused a stay of an oppression action initiated by a shareholder pending a reference to arbitration. The Court found that based on the facts of the case, the minority oppression claim was non-arbitrable. There were relevant parties, including other shareholders, who were not parties to the arbitration. Further, the Plaintiff in the oppression action was seeking for remedies that the arbitral tribunal could not grant, including winding up.
Briefly, there was an arbitration clause in an agreement between only two of the shareholders. The Plaintiff filed an oppression action against both the party to the arbitration agreement as well as against non-parties (being the directors and some of the other shareholders of the Company). The Plaintiff sought a share buy-out order, an alternative prayer for winding up, and for several declaratory orders.
The Judge took great lengths in looking at the developments in Australia, Canada and the UK, and the academic commentary arising from those cases. In particular, the Judge distinguished the English Court of Appeal decision in Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards and another [2012] Ch 333 (where an unfair prejudice action was stayed pending arbitration) as the unfair prejudice relief in that case was for a specific injunction Order. There was no possibility of a share buy-out or winding up in that case.
This is a fascinating area of the law where there is still no clear answer on the right balance to be struck. On the one hand, there is the policy of interpreting an arbitration clause as wide as possible in order for contracting parties to be bound by their bargain to go to the exclusive forum of arbitration. On the other hand, parties e.g. shareholders, may still want to rely on their statutory remedies and the Court will have to consider whether a dispute is arbitrable or not.
Of Counsel 