Of Barristers and Solicitors

Malaysia enjoys a fused legal profession in that there is no legal distinction between an advocate and solicitor. When one is Called to the Bar, one is admitted as an Advocate and Solicitor of the High Court of Malaya.This is in contrast to countries, for instance England and Wales, which have a split profession. One is either a barrister or a solicitor. Barristers enjoy the rights of audience to appear before the higher courts, rights which to a large extent solicitors are unable to enjoy. Solicitors may carry out the litigation through exchange of correspondences as well as the drafting of the court papers, tasks which barristers are forbidden from carrying out.

Barristers also provide specialist legal advice to solicitors, which therefore draws some comparison to the medical profession, whereby solicitors can be seen as general practitioners while barristers are specialists in advocacy or advisory services.

As explained by Epstein, the barrister-solicitor distinction dates from the 13th century, when English courts held that only advocates who had regularly come before them could argue a litigant’s case. An advocate was allowed to enter the picture only at the final argument stage, so that the litigant had to make the initial pleadings himself. Advocates were precursors to barristers.

By the 15th century, litigants were allowed to hire out-of-court attorneys to submit pleadings in writing, and these attorneys were precursors to solicitors. As the demand for legal services increased with economic development, so did the need for courtroom advocates. Inns of Court arose to train and regulate the advocates — drawn exclusively from the upper classes — as the only people authorised to appear before high-court judges. In the 16th century, the division between barristers and solicitors became fixed. Clients dealt only with solicitors, and solicitors arranged for barristers.

Epstein argues that this historical baggage provides scant reason for such a market division, and I agree with this contention. One argument in support of the continued split in the profession is that having an independent barrister reviewing a cause of action gives the client a fresh and independent opinion from an expert in the field, something that rarely happens in jurisdictions with fused professions. Another is that by having recourse to all of the specialist barristers at the Bar, it levels the playing field by enabling smaller firms, who could not maintain large specialist departments, to compete with larger firms.

One clear disadvantange of maintaining a split profession is that of possibly high legal fees. Multiplicity of legal advisers will necessarily lead to higher costs.

In England and Wales, the clear demarcation between barristers and solicitors have eroded with solicitors also enjoying rights of audience if they become qualified as solicitor-advocates. Solicitor-advocates can also enjoy the title of Queen Counsel. Further, larger solicitor firms have also started to hire barristers to act as their specialist in-house Counsel.

This post does not propose to cover in-depth the vast span of this topic, and I have not been able to flesh out the advantages or disadvantages of maintaining either a fused or split profession. I would however like to invite views though on these issues.

It is noted that in 2004, in the Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England and Wales, dubbed the Clementi Report, Sir David Clementi did examine the present framework of the provision of legal services in England and Wales. The Report did touch on the split in the barrister and solicitor profession. While making no recommendations on converting to a fused profession (it appears that the Report did not consider such a step), there were recommendations made in creating alternative business structures which would allow solicitors and barristers to enter into partnership together, as well as entering into partnerships with non-lawyers.

This post was also brought about by this interesting article on a QC who had requalified as a solicitor to head the advocacy unit of Herbert Smith.

The Abolishment of the CLP

It was announced today that the Certificate of Legal Practice (CLP) will be scrapped in favour of a Common Bar Course. The Bar Council has affirmed its support of such a proposal. Since 1993, the Malaysian Bar has been advocating the establishment of a Common Bar Course (CBC) as a single entry point into the legal profession for all law graduates (both local and foreign. The CBC is intended to replace the CLP and all law graduates must enroll and successfully complete the CBC in order to practise law in Malaysia.In his article ‘The CLP – A change would do us all good’, Weng Tchung explained in detail the history of the CLP course, and I gratefully refer to his in-depth analysis of the background of the CLP. The same author has also made many points in his piece entitled ‘The CLP and the Proposed Common Bar Course’.

I would like to also emphasise the points he has made that practical subjects must be part of the syllabus. Under the present CLP system, students learn by rote and purely regurgitate procedural rules they have memorised. There are no subjects in relation to conferencing, negotiations or advocacy. Singapore itself is considering a revamp and a move towards a common Vocational Training Course.

While I think the abolishment of the CLP and a move towards the CBC is a step in the right direction, the present lack of details about the implementation of this proposed CBC leaves me cautious. Will this CBC act as a gatekeeper to ensure high standards are met before an individual can enter the profession? Or will some form of unseen quota system be enforced behind the scenes? Or even worse, the doors will be left wide open to let all and sundry in?

TSMP Law Corporation

TSMP Law Corporation was featured in this articlein the Singapore Business Times.

I have many fond memories of my short attachment stint there, where I was still in law school, and being exposed to litigation for the first time. Was lucky to drop in just before a trial started, helped to research several points of law, and then had a chance to see senior counsel in action.

But back to the points raised in the article, and to highlight two sections:

One way he believes TSMP can attain this goal is by hiring the best practitioners. ‘We pay the highest starting salary in Singapore now – $5,000,’ he says. ‘Law graduates these days have so many options that we find that this is one of the ways to attract and retain the best.’

I see the starting salary in Singapore is creeping towards the S$5,000 level. Money may not be the most important factor to pick a certain firm, but I am sure it definitely ranks as one of the more important factors.

‘We also reward our lawyers well, promoting the exceptional ones quickly. We made four people junior equity partners recently – and some of them have only five years’ working experience. This helps our people to think like leaders early on, and it helps us in our succession planning – in grooming people to take over.

This may be a sticking point for certain law firms, and may or may not be confined to the larger firms. Should a firm promote an exceptional lawyer quickly, thereby rewarding that lawyer for his performance and also setting an example by which other lawyers can aim for? Or should a firm be rigid in their promotion schedule, where you must attain a minimum number of years before you can be promoted from associate to senior associate level, or from senior associate to junior partner level?

The drawbacks of adopting the former is that it may draw jealousy from the other lawyers, it may breed whispers in the corridor as to why a certain lawyer is allowed to leapfrog ahead while more senior lawyers have not been promoted yet. The drawbacks of the latter is not there is no reward for excelling, where promotion seems almost automatic unless you mess up some where.

I am not advocating that there should be wanton promotion of junior lawyers, that if you can’t make partner in less than 5 years, you were just not a good enough lawyer. There are so many aspects to being succesful in the practice of law, not just in terms of your knowledge of the law, but also the important aspect of how to bring in and maintain your clients. Such skills can only be honed with time. So there is no frantic rush to partnership or promotion, but it will still be encouraging to see the relaxation of rigid promotion policies.

The National Language in the Courts

A very common question asked by friends who aren’t in the legal profession, or friends outside of Malaysia, is whether the Malay language has to be used in court. For the purposes of this blog entry, allow me to side-step the debate surrounding the correct usage of the term Bahasa Malaysia or Bahasa Melayu, and just refer to all generically as the Malay language.The short answer to the posed question is that strictly under the law, all proceedings and court papers have to be in the national language i.e. the Malay language.

This is covered specifically under statute as well as the rules governing court procedure. But it was not always the case where it was compulsory to use Malay in the court.

In Malaysia pre-independence, the English language was used in all the courts. Even when the National Language Act was introduced in 1963 making the Malay language the official language of Malaysia, the courts were exempted from making the transition from English to Malay.

However, on 30 March 1990, the National Language (Amendment) Act 1990 came into force which removed the exemption enjoyed by the courts. The new section 8 now reads:

All proceedings (other than the giving of evidence by a witness) in the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court or any Subordinate Court shall be in the national language

Provided that the Court may either of its own motion or on the application of any party to any proceedings and after considering the interests of justice in those proceedings, order that the proceedings (other than the giving of evidence by a witness) shall be partly in the national language and partly in the English language.

Subsequently, the Rules of the High Court 1980 which govern the manner in which court proceedings are carried out was also amended to mandate the use of the national language. However, this restriction only applies to court proceedings within West Malaysia. Sabah and Sarawak still continue to be allowed to use the English language. In fact, the Rules of the High Court 1980 directs that for Sabah and Sarawak, any document to be used in court shall be in the English language and may be accompanied by a translation in the Malay language.

“Order 92 Rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court

(1) Subject to subrule 2, any document required for use in pursuance of these rules shall be in the national language and may be accompanied by a translation thereof in the English language…

(2) For Sabah and Sarawak, any document required for use in pursuance of these rules shall be in the English language and may be accompanied by a translation thereof in the national language …”

If you speak to some senior lawyers who moved out of litigation, the compulsory switch from the English language to the Malay language more or less cemented their decision to leave litigation for good. This also signalled the start of the ‘mandatory’ component of every pupillage, translation!

All court documents now need to be translated into the Malay language, and I am sure every single pupil would have done their significant share of helping lawyers to translate affidavits or other cause papers into Malay. Some of the larger law firms can afford to employ dedicated translators to help with some of the translation. But ultimately, there is still no escaping from doing your own translation work. Having worked hours and hours crafting an affidavit, you then spend as many hours leafing through English-to-Malay dictionaries to translate your work. I always find it ironical that the English portions are marked ‘Terjemahan’ (‘translation’ in Malay) when in actual fact, the English portions are drafted first and then translated into Malay.

This compulsory use of the Malay language is relaxed somewhat at the High Court when lawyers are making submissions. Generally, the Registrars and the Judges allow you to file in your skeletal written submissions in English, as well as to orally submit in English. At the subordinate courts, the use of Malay is still more or less compulsory. This means written and oral submissions all have to be in Malay. With my atrocious command of Malay, no surprise then that I do not look forward to my matters at the subordinate courts.

At the appellate courts, being the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court, English is almost exclusively used. I know of certain appellate judges who will tick off Counsel for failing to file in the English translation of the court papers at the High Court level, when these documents are referred to at the appellate stage.

English is also widely-used in the written judgments of the Courts. I would estimate at least 90% of the reported judgments are in the English language.

It is a pity that the court system had to adopt the usage of the Malay language, and could not enjoy the previous exemption. From a commercial point of view, nearly all contracts are drafted in English and it would make sense for litigation arising from these contracts to continue in English. The language used in international commerce is largely English, so again, if parties negotiate for Malaysian courts to adjudicate on a dispute, it would be a plus for the Court language to be in English.

But the use of the Malay language in the Court is necessary as this is a common language understood by all Malaysians. In a criminal court for instance, if charges are being read out to an accused who is unrepresented, the Malay language would largely be understood by all.

The Statutory Derivative Action

The Minority Shareholder’s Sword to Pierce the Majority’s Twin Shields of Corporate Personality and Majority Rule[26/9/2010: This article must now be read subject to the Malaysian authorities applying the new statutory derivative action provisions. The present leading decision is the Court of Appeal case of Celcom (Malaysia) Berhad v Mohd Shuaib Ishak]

Part A. Introduction

A derivative action is an action brought by a shareholder based on a cause of action that the company has, rather than a cause of action belonging to the shareholder. The common law allows a minority shareholder to bring this action on behalf of the company in situations where the company does not take action because the wrongdoer controls the company and is able to prevent the company from taking any action.

The new statutory derivative action allows a shareholder to sidestep the restrictions of the common law derivative action.

The new statutory derivative action, under sections 181A to 181E of the Companies Act 1965 (“the Act”), allows a complainant to apply for leave of the Court to bring an action on behalf of the company. This new action, which came into effect on 15 August 2007 under the Companies (Amendment) Act 2007, allows a shareholder to sidestep the restrictions of the common law derivative action.

The common law rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189 states that if a company suffers a wrong then, because it is a separate legal entity from its shareholders, prima facie it is the company that should bring an action. Such a rule allowed a shareholder to bring an action on behalf of the company if two elements could be proven. First, that the wrong is one that cannot be validly ratified by the majority as there has been a fraud on the minority, and second, that the perpetrators of the fraud were in control of the company.

The new statutory derivative action bypasses the narrow Foss v Harbottle rule. However, it is clear that the right to bring a common law derivative action continues to be maintained here in Malaysia (see section 181A(3) of the Act).

The new sections 181A to 181E of the Act are very similar to the statutory derivative action provisions of the Singapore Companies Act, which were in turn modelled after the provisions of the Canadian Business Corporations Act.


Part B. Applicable to Pre-Amendment Wrongdoings?

Before delving into the provisions of the statutory derivative action, it is submitted that the new provisions can apply to wrongdoings or events which occurred before the coming into force of the amendments, i.e. before 15 August 2007. This may be the case where a member of the company seeks leave to bring an action but the issue is not so clear in respect of other parties seeking leave to bring a statutory derivative action.

…the new sections 181A to 181E of the Act merely set out a new procedural form for the common law derivative action, and therefore these provisions are applicable retrospectively to pre-amendment wrongdoings.


It can be strongly argued that the new sections 181A to 181E of the Act merely set out a new procedural form for the common law derivative action, and therefore these provisions are applicable retrospectively to pre-amendment wrongdoings. In the Federal Court decision of Lee Chow Meng v Public Prosecutor [1978] 2 MLJ 36, it was recognised that a statute dealing with procedure has retrospective effect, that is, it applies to proceedings begun before and after the commencement of the statute, unless a contrary intention is expressed or clearly implied. The statutory recognition of the common law right to bring proceedings on behalf of the company is stressed in section 181A(3) of the Act.

Although the Australian provisions on statutory derivative actions are quite dissimilar to the Malaysian provisions, the Australian cases of Advent Investors Pty Ltd and Others v Goldhirsch and Others [2001] 37 ACSR 529 (“Advent Investors“) and Karam & Ors v ANZ Banking Group Ltd & Anor (2000) 34 ACSR 545 (“Karam“) held that the new provisions merely set out a new procedure to bring proceedings on behalf of a company and therefore could apply retrospectively to pre-amendment events. It must be noted that the issues in these two cases primarily involved claimants in each case, who had brought a common law derivative action, arguing that they need not seek leave to bring an action when the new provisions of the Corporations Act came into effect i.e. that the new provisions on seeking leave to bring a statutory derivative action were prospective. The new provisions had displaced the common law derivative action and the Courts held that the provisions were retrospective and that leave was required.

One issue that must be highlighted however, is that while the statutory derivative action may be a procedural streamlining of the common law derivative action brought by a member of a company, the statutory derivative action goes further than that in granting standing to a director and even a former member of a company to bring an action. Such parties were never recognised as having the locus standi to bring a derivative action. It could be argued that a retrospective application of sections 181A to 181E of the Act should not apply to such parties.

In both Advent Investors and Karam, the issue of whether the provisions applied retrospectively arose in cases involving shareholders bringing a derivative action. It is not clear how the issue on retrospectivity will play out if for instance, a director seeks leave under section 181B of the Act, in respect of wrongdoings prior to the amendments to the Act.

Or perhaps a simpler answer can be that there is no reference to events or wrongdoing in the new provisions, and section 181A of the Act merely allows a complainant to bring an action on behalf of a company. The company, on behalf of which the action is being brought, always had the right to sue for pre-amendment wrongs. The difficult untanglement of the new provisions could have been avoided if the Companies (Amendment) Act 2007 had contained some transitional or saving provisions.

Part C. Who Can Apply for Leave to Bring a Statutory Derivative Action?

Section 181B of the Act requires a ‘complainant’ to seek leave of the Court to bring a derivative action in the name of the company. Unlike the common law derivative action which is confined to only members of the company, section 181A(4) of the Act allows a wider standing for a complainant to bring an application for leave from the Court.

A complainant is defined as (1) a member, or a person entitled to be registered as a member, of a company; (2) a former member of a company if the application relates to circumstances in which the member ceased to be a member; (3) any director; or (4) the Registrar for certain types of company.

Part D. Requirements for Leave

(i) Notice

One criticism of this requirement of notice is that unlike in other jurisdictions, the Court is not given the discretion to allow for the dispensation of such a notice.


The first requirement in applying for leave of the Court is that the complainant must give thirty days notice in writing to the directors of his intention to apply for leave under section 181A of the Act. The purpose of this compulsory notice is to first give the company the opportunity, through its board of directors, to consider its rights and course of action.

One criticism of this requirement of notice is that unlike in other jurisdictions, the Court is not given the discretion to allow for the dispensation of such a notice. In cases where urgent injunctive relief is required, for instance where there is a wrongful dissipation of the company’s assets by the directors, the compulsory 30-day notice to be given to the wrongdoers themselves prior to applying for leave would discourage a complainant from utilising the remedy of a statutory derivative action.

(ii) Good Faith

After the 30-day notice, a complainant can make an application by originating summons for leave of the Court (as required by section 181B of the Act). There are two requirements which the Court shall take into account when deciding whether or not to grant leave. The first is whether the complainant is acting in good faith.

The Singapore Court of Appeal has held in Pang Yong Hock and another v PKS Contracts Services Pte Ltd [2004] 3 SLR 1 (“Pang Yang Hock”) that “the best way of demonstrating good faith is to show a legitimate claim which the directors are unreasonably reluctant to pursue with the appropriate vigour or at all.” This echoes what was held in the Canadian case of Re Richardson Greenshields of Canada Ltd and Kalmacoff et al (1995) 123 DLR (4th) 628 in that “there [were] legitimate legal questions raised here that call for judicial resolution.”

The Singapore Court of Appeal in Pang Yang Hock also approved the case of Agus Irawan v Toh Teck Chye & Ors [2002] 2 SLR 198 (“Agus Irawan”) which suggested that the burden would be on the opponent to show that the applicant did not act in good faith. The Singapore Court of Appeal had also noted that hostility between factions involved is normally present in such applications and is therefore generally insufficient evidence of lack of good faith on the part of the applicant.

(iii) Prima Facie in the Best Interest of Company

The second requirement which must be demonstrated is that it appears prima facie to be in the best interest of the company that the application for leave be granted. As observed in Agus Irawan, this requirement of good faith overlaps with the requirement that the claim must be in the interests of the company.

Agus Irawan had interpreted the almost identical Singapore provision to mean that the claim must have a reasonable semblance of merit – not that it was bound to succeed or likely to succeed, but that if proved, the company will stand to gain substantially in money or money’s worth.

The Court may also weigh the availability of an alternative remedy, such as the winding up of the company. In Pang Yang Hock, where there was an impasse in the management of the company and the company was not performing well financially, the appropriate solution in that case was to wind up the company.

Part E. Leave to Discontinue, Compromise or Settle Proceedings

This provision recognises the danger that such an action may be brought for the sole purpose of and in the hope of reaching some collusive settlement for the benefit of the complainant and the alleged wrongdoers.


Section 181C of the Act provides that proceedings brought, intervened in or defended under section 181A may be settled only with leave of the Court. This provision recognises the danger that such an action may be brought for the sole purpose of and in the hope of reaching some collusive settlement for the benefit of the complainant and the alleged wrongdoers. The interests of the other shareholders or the company may then be prejudiced if the action is settled. This provision allows the Court to reject the settlement of the action if it considers the terms unfair or unjust.


Part F. Ratification

Under common law, if a wrong has been effectively ratified by the shareholders of the company, this will be a complete bar to a derivative action. The company will not have any wrong to complaint about as an act authorised by its shareholders is an act of the company itself.

Section 181D of the Act does away with this problem by providing that the fact the alleged wrong to the company may be approved or ratified by the members is not by itself sufficient for a stay or dismissal of the action. Such approval or ratification may however be taken into account by the Court when determining whether to grant leave under section 181B of the Act and in the making of any orders under section 181E of the Act.

Part G. Powers of the Court

In granting leave, section 181E of the Act grants the Court wide ranging powers in making such orders as it thinks appropriate. Aside from authorising the complainant or some other person to control the conduct of the proceedings, some of the other orders the Court may grant include: –

In granting leave, section 181E of the Act grants the Court wide ranging powers in making such orders as it thinks appropriate.

 

(i) Giving Directions

Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Court is able to grant specific directions for the conduct of the proceedings. In the Singapore case of Teo Gek Luang v Ng Ai Tiong [1999] 1 SLR 434, the Court granted leave to the complainant subject to certain conditions. The Court exercised its discretion, under the similar Singapore provisions, to make an order that the complainant was not to commence action until 22 days had passed, and if the defendant-director paid the sums due to the company within 14 days of the order, the complainant was not to commence an action.

(ii) Access to Information

This provision allows a complainant to obtain evidence by accessing documents normally not available to him, for instance Board documents or management accounts.

(ii) Costs

Sections 181E(d) and (e) of the Act allows the Court to relieve the burden of costs on the complainant by allowing both a payment by the company of reasonable legal fees and disbursements incurred by the complainant, and also a wider order for indemnity for all the costs incurred.

The Court may be guided by the principle set out in Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373, where Denning J (as he then was) suggested that where there is a reasonable case for the minority shareholder to bring an action at the expense at the company, then the shareholder should ordinarily have a right to an indemnity for his costs, whether or not the case is successful.

Part H. Conclusion

Based on the experience from the other jurisdictions, it is not anticipated that the new statutory derivative action will open the floodgates of shareholder litigation. Derivative litigation by its nature is altruistic in that the benefit of any remedy goes to the company. The plaintiff-shareholder will only benefit indirectly and even then, only on a pro-rata basis. The other shareholders not involved in the proceedings would free-ride on any successful litigation, without any of the risks.

…it is not anticipated that the new statutory derivative action will open the floodgates of shareholder litigation.


Unlike in Canada and New Zealand, Malaysia’s provisions do not allow the Court to order for damages to be paid directly to the complainant. A shareholder will still be more attracted, where practicable, to the filing of an oppression petition under section 181 of the Act due to the prospect of obtaining personal relief against the oppression and not merely damages to be paid to the company.

However, the lack of statutory derivative litigation in other jurisdictions may also be an indication that it does serve as an effective deterrent on managerial misconduct by imposing the threat of liability. As one academic commented more than a decade ago, ‘the knowledge that one is being watched and that one must justify one’s actions improves the behaviour of most individuals.’

The introduction of the statutory derivative action increases the scope of shareholder intervention, while the leave requirements will ensure that there are safeguards against abuse of unjustified litigation. Allowing for increased shareholder activism will ensure that directors of companies will have to take into greater account shareholder rights and interests.

Injunction against Moody’s

Interesting bit of news I came across on Allco Commercial Real Estate Investment Trust’s failed attempt to obtain an injunction against Moody’s Investors Service.Moody’s is a credit rating agency that assigns credit ratings and ranks the credit-worthiness of borrowers using a standardised ratings scale. More on the history of Moody’s is set out in the Washington Post.

Allco Commercial REIT is listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange, with assets in Singapore and Australia.

On 12 March 2008, Allco managed to obtain an injunction to restrain Moody’s from issuing a downgrade on the trust. The injunction also prevented Moody’s from holding any meeting or discussion to review Allco’s credit rating.

Presumably this injunction was applied and granted ex parte, which resulted in Moody’s applying to set aside the injunction.

Quoting from the Straits Times today:

Allco Commercial Real Estate Investment Trust (Reit) felt a $620 million bank refinancing deal could be jeopardised by a downgrade, according to court documents obtained by The Straits Times.

In an affidavit, Allco Singapore chief executive Nicholas McGrath said he was shocked to hear of the planned downgrade as he had been assured by Moody’s that its panel would not decide on Allco’s rating until today.

‘I also informed Moody’s that it was crucial that there was no revision of Allco Reit’s rating before the requisite credit approvals from its bankers were obtained for the refinancing of its debts worth $620 million.’

But Mr Peter Choy, a vice-president and senior credit officer at Moody’s Investors Service, said in an affidavit that the agency had made no such assurances.

He said: ‘If there was ever any suggestion that Moody’s customers could control or influence its ratings, the market would no longer trust the ratings that it gives.’

It will be interesting reading the legal arguments both for and against such an injunction, and the written grounds of judgment are not out yet. From a cursory examination, it seems difficult for Allco to establish any right for such an injunction, in that there is no serious issue to be tried. But the injunction did get past the ex parte stage, and Allco’s Counsel must have convinced the Judge that there were some merits.

This hasn’t been the first time that such an injunction has been sought against a credit rating agency. In 2003, Tranz Rail Holdings Ltd had tried to obtain an injunction from the High Court of New Zealand against Standard & Poor to restrain it from issuing a press release confirming a downgrade in rating. This application was subsequently withdrawn.

Better Drafting

Times Online continues with its well-written series on How to Become a Better Lawyer with a new installment on how to improve your written draftingin the context of litigation.

Highlighting just two sections from the article:

A large part of the war occurs in the correspondence. I give the same level of consideration to drafting letters to the other side as I do to writing formal opinions. “Dear Judge” letters, I call them, because even if they’re written before litigation has commenced, they should always be drafted with the eyes of the judge in mind. They’re your opportunity to show not only that your client has behaved reasonably and sensibly from the beginning, but — and this is crucial for getting your costs if you win — that you’ve grasped the essential legal issues early on and have stuck to them.

These are otherwise known as the “self-serving” letters. Especially useful prior to the commencement of litigation, and even prior to lawyers officially coming on record and issuing letters. Lawyers can assist their client in drafting letters on client letterheads to further strengthen the client’s position in view of imminent litigation. A common example which crops up is that parties tend to not put their complaints down in writing. Or too much negotiation and communication take place verbally and over the phone. A “Dear Judge” letter can help flesh out the breaches of a contract or complaints. It can help solidify the exact terms of the contract, some of which may not be in writing, some may be implied, some may have been negotiated verbally.

Some people love to seem so clever. When I was younger I used to think that I was too stupid to understand those documents where you have to read a paragraph several times in order to understand it. But gradually I realised that the problem was that some people simply have a drafting style that is far too complex. Look at the speeches of the great House of Lords judges of our day: beautifully written but in plain, clear English.

This is the common complaint of ‘legalese’. How many times have we seen the use of double negatives cropping up in a sentence we draft?

It cannot be said that the Defendant is not in breach of his obligations….”

One my pet peeves is seeing the overuse of words such as “herewith” or “therein“. There are too many cover letters which use the phrase “We enclose herewith a copy of the affidavit.” It can simply be abbreviated to “We enclose a copy of the affidavit.”

I would highly recommend that all lawyers pick up these books from Bryan A. Garner, The Winning Brief and Legal Writing in Plain English. The author provides very detailed technical tips in improving the way you draft letters and draft written submissions. It is not merely a case of cutting out the legalese, but the books help you to present your arguments across more effectively, how to make use of headers, effective use of punctuation and how to format your points. You then realise that it takes a lot of effort to write better, and you realise the number of bad habits you have picked up.

Just to highlight some examples from the books:

(i) Use the active voice rather than the passive

A simple way to remember this is that being active, you are doing something. The passive indicates something being done to you. An easy test in spotting the passive voice: if you see a be-verb (eg. is, are, was) followed by a past participle (usually a verb ending in –ed), then you have a passive voice construction. So here is an example on how you convert the passive voice into the active one:

passive: This is the legal question which has to be determined by the court.

active: The court will have to determine this legal question.

The advantages of the active voice is that it usually requires fewer words, and it better reflects a chronologically ordered sequence, active: actor -> action -> recipient of action, rather than passive: recipient of action -> action -> actor.

(ii) Turn -ion words into verbs when you can

This is something which I think a lot of us do without thinking. For instance, instead of “someone was in violation of the law”, we can state that “someone has violated the law.”

The advantages of editing -ion words are that you will avoid inert be-verbs by replacing them with action verbs , and you’ll humanise the text by saying who does what.

Let’s apply both examples to the following sentence (which is the way I may have drafted ordinarily):

“A revocation application will normally receive no consideration by the board unless there have been no sales for two consecutive years.”

Switch it around to:

“The board will normally not consider a revocation application unless there have been no sales for two consecutive years.”

The Queen’s Counsel

Queen’s Counsel are barristers, and more recently advocate-solicitors, appointed by patent to be one of Her Majesty’s counsel learned in the law. It has become a mark of recognition of a leading counsel.

History of the Queen’s Counsel

In the late 16th century, a body of counsel were appointed to give assistance and advice to the Solicitor-General and Attorney-General. They were often consulted in capital cases and in cases of state. Queen’s Counsel were at that time expected to become advocates on behalf of the Sovereign. During the reign of a king they were called King’s Counsel.From the beginning, they were not allowed to appear against the Crown without a special licence, but this was generally given as a formality. This was particularly important in criminal cases, which are mostly brought in the name of the Crown, with the result that, until 1920 in England and Wales, King’s and Queen’s Counsel had to have a licence to appear in criminal cases for the defence.

Such limitations have since been removed over the centuries, and the office has now become purely honorary and is a recognition of achievement in the legal profession. While it used to be purely confined to barristers, advocate-solicitors have now also been appointed as QCs.

Lawyers who have been appointed as a QC are entitled to wear silk gowns, rather than the ordinary cotton or “stuff” gowns when they appear in court, hence becoming a QC is termed “taking silk” for this reason.

Other jurisdictions

Some Commonwealth countries had also adopted the QC nomenclature, for instance Australia, New Zealand, and Hong Kong. The title of Queen’s Counsel has largely been replaced with the title of Senior Counsel instead.

Singapore initiated its own Senior Counsel Scheme in 1997 to recognise outstanding advocates. You can read this interesting interview with the Senior Counsel Selection Committee, an extract as follows:

What circumstances led to the implementation of the SC Scheme in Singapore in 1997? Was it a matter of natural progression, having cut formal legal ties with England in the early 1990s? Or was the Scheme started to provide a career path for practitioners? Would not competence, reputation and previous experience provide adequate distinction? How important was it, at that time, to put in place a scheme that would allow the Singapore legal community to develop its own pantheon of respected advocates?

It was extremely important for Singapore to put in place a formal scheme whereby our best advocates would be accorded due recognition by the Judiciary for their legal expertise and advocacy skills. In the absence of a such a scheme and the easy availability of Queen’s Counsel (“QC”) to plead in our courts, it was inevitable that however good or skilful our advocates might be, they would be looked upon by litigants and the public as second-class litigators and inferior to any QC, whatever his seniority might be. This did not reflect the reality in many cases, although in general it had to be conceded that the best QC was a notch above our best advocate.

In other words, without a formal SC Scheme, we could end up short-changing our own lawyers. The situation was, unfortunately, exacerbated by the perception that QC would get a better hearing from the Judiciary than local advocates, with the result that if one party appointed a QC to represent him, his opponent felt that his case would not be given the same consideration if he did not appoint another QC to represent him. In order to build up our own corps of advocates that could be immediately recognisable by prospective litigants and also by other advocates and solicitors, the SC Scheme was introduced. Such a public recognition would also serve as an incentive for advocates to improve and enhance their legal expertise and advocacy skills in order to attain that status.
Also read this interview with 3 SCs. Highly recommended reading.

A Malaysian Senior Counsel Scheme?

Malaysia does not have any such QC or SC scheme in place. While it is legitimate to stress the importance of giving recognition to outstanding advocates, I would be very fearful of any such system being implemented. The risk of abuse is too great. I can see the grave danger of it being converted into a form of political patronage (if the government has any say in the appointment of SCs).

Lawyers here in Malaysia already point to the lack of transparency and the evident abuse in the judicial appointments system (this is with reference to the recent facts being unearthed before the Royal Commission enquiring into the Lingam tape). I am sad to say that just like for most things in Malaysia, any Malaysian Senior Counsel appointments would possibly be influenced through political connections or even racial quotas, rather than true meritocracy.

YL Convention: Reflections

I thought the YL Convention was overall a good one. I definitely had a good time, although I did have to leave early and rush back on Saturday night.

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I thought the stand-out session was the one in relation to “IT: How Does It Make Us Mighty?” It demonstrated that when you have a good panel of speakers, giving different perspectives, as well as a good moderator to control the flow of speakers as well as the audience participation, you can get a very interesting session. Issues such as whether BlackBerry is a tool of empowerment or enslavement was touched on, as well as the impact of technology on the speed and pace of practice. Instantaneous responses are now expected, the lines are blurred between office and out-of-office hours. We are a service industry, and we are there to service the needs of clients, so we will have to increasingly cope with almost round-the-clock queries especially with clients from different time zones. If you aren’t going to step up to face such demands, there will be another lawyer to the left and to the right of you who will.

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I have to admit that I had given little thought before this on how different legal practice could be outside of KL. But it was good on the part of the moderator to emphasise that the IT needs of a small law firm in one of the smaller states would be vastly different from the IT necessities expounded by some of the members of the panel. A lawyer from Ipoh spoke of how her law firm did not have a computer at all, but that did not get in the way of the firm’s practice. The firm’s clients could be illiterate but a very successful businessmen, so the concept of emails or even letters would be something very foreign. Another lawyer from Kelantan explained how different practice was like in that state. There were no such long working hours, and the concept of a client contacting you past 5.30pm was virtually unheard of.

It was good for that session to highlight the dichotomy between practice in a large law firm in KL, and perhaps the smaller firms outside of KL. Inevitably though, as clients’ needs evolve, even in the smaller towns, law firms will be forced to embrace more and more of IT. The illiterate quarry owner will soon hand over the quarry to his IT-savvy children, and then the law firm or lawyers will also be forced to change the way they practice.

In contrast to that IT session, which remained focused on the topic at hand, some of the other sessions were a little bit less successful. For instance, in the first session, “The New Lawyers: Gen Y” started off well I thought, with the various speakers, me included, giving different viewpoints on this new concept of Generation Y. A mere marketing term or something that really exists? The moderator had an idea on which points he wanted to develop, but the danger of these interactive talk-show style sessions is that it may slowly move off-point or become a complaining session. While it is good to use personal experiences or anecdotes to highlight certain points, I certainly didn’t want to see the session slowly end up focusing only on the bad experiences some of the lawyers had during their pupillage.

I think the scope of the topics for the YL Convention was wide and it should have been very interesting. While some of the sessions were a big success, some were quite a let-down. It actually boils down quite a lot to the strength of your speakers. Maybe future organisors should use less on the “talk-show” format which was widely used at this Convention. While it provides for a very interesting discussion, there is the danger of the session going off-point without a strong moderator. There should be a balance of the talk-show format as well as the conventional presentation of papers, but maybe then with more time allocated to Q&A and interaction. It allows participants to have physical papers to take away and read, and it also forces the speakers to be focused in their delivery and to come prepared. I am still a fan of the talk-show format though, and that format depends a lot on the moderator setting out clear guidelines on the different aspect each speaker should touch on.

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Young Lawyers Convention

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The National Young Lawyers Committee is staging its 3rd Young Lawyers Conventionthis weekend, Friday – Sunday. It will be held at the City Bayview Hotel in Penang.I have been invited to be a speaker at the first session “The New Lawyers: Gen Y”, and I think it will be an interesting interactive session to kick off the convention.

The convention is so multi-faceted and it covers a wide range of topics which I think is highly relevant to all young practitioners everywhere. The panelists and speakers will be young lawyers, senior practitioners, law academics, all giving different view points.